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COMMENT
FORCE MAJEURE AND THE CORONAVIRUS: EXPOSING THE
“FORESEEABLE” CLASH BETWEEN FORCE MAJEURE’S
COMMON LAW AND CONTRACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE
ROBYN S. LESSANS*
COVID-19 presents unique challenges and opportunities for modern
contract jurisprudence.1 Due to the social, political, and economic upheaval,2
masses of contracting parties are seeking an “out” to their contractual
obligations via exculpatory “force majeure” clauses.3 The implications of
this one little clause cannot be overstated. In some cases, hundreds of
millions of dollars rest upon the construction of a few words in the oftenoverlooked, boilerplate language of the force majeure clause.4 However,
force majeure as a legal doctrine is woefully underdeveloped, 5 and in many
states there is little to no state law interpreting these clauses.6 Courts that
© 2021 Robyn S. Lessans.
*
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1. Lydia Wheeler, Coronavirus Threatens to Flood Courts with Contract Disputes,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/coronavirus-threatens-to-flood-courts-with-contract-disputes (noting that COVID-19 “has
left companies across an array of industries wondering what to do if they can’t perform the services
they are contractually obligated to provide”).
2. The United States’ GDP dropped to the lowest recorded level in modern American history.
Coronavirus: US Economy Sees Sharpest Contraction in Decades, BBC (July 30, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53574953.
3. The term “force majeure” describes an overpowering event, caused by forces outside of
human control. Ky. Utilities Co. v. S. E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Ky. 1992) (citing Force
Majeure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
4. See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. ex rel Dep’t of Intercollegiate Athletics
v. Under Armour, Inc., 2:20-cv-7798 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (alleging breach of fifteen-year, $280
million contract and arguing COVID-19 may not constitute a force majeure).
5. Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Force majeure,
is now little more than a descriptive phrase without much inherent substance.”).
6. See Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)
(noting force majeure as a new concept to Ohio law); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of South
Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing “Indiana has very few cases interpreting
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have never interpreted the force majeure clause, or have previously given it
a cursory review, now must make important interpretative decisions. These
choices may determine which businesses survive disruptions in performance
caused by COVID-19. Even more broadly, these choices will shape force
majeure construction and interpretation in a post-COVID-19 world.7
This Comment highlights a largely unexplored area8 of force majeure
jurisprudence: the unclear and conflicting relationship between force majeure
as a contractual tool and force majeure as a term of common-law
significance.9 At common-law, force majeure was traditionally defined as an
unforeseeable event that prevents compliance with contractual obligations.10
By contrast, modern contract jurisprudence developed an increased reliance
on force majeure clauses, in which parties identify specific events that may
excuse nonperformance.11 These force majeure clauses do not need to be
unforeseeable to be enforceable.12
This Comment demonstrates how these two conceptions of force
majeure inevitably clash on the subject of foreseeability and it articulates why
that clash matters.13 If a court presumes parties intend force majeure’s
common-law significance to bear on the clause, the court will impose an
unforeseeability requirement on the delineated force majeure events.14 By
contrast, if a court presumes the parties intend the terms of the force majeure
clause to exclusively control, a foreseeable force majeure event may still

force majeure clauses”); URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ.,
915 F. Supp. 1267, 1286 (D.R.I. 1996) (noting “Rhode Island case law provides little guidance” in
analyzing force majeure clauses); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crompton Corp., No. 020435, 2002 WL
1023435, at *2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 29, 2002) (“Pennsylvania state cases addressing force majeure
are surprisingly few and far between.”); Erickson v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., 474 N.W.2d 150, 154
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“[Force majeure] is virtually unknown in Michigan common law.”); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Vinyltech Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Ariz. 1989) (noting the lack of
Arizona caselaw interpreting force majeure provisions).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018)
(noting only two jurisdictions other than Texas that have addressed this area of force majeure).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 706 F.2d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“[I]t is well settled that a force majeure clause . . . defines the area of unforeseeable events that
might excuse nonperformance within the contract period.”).
11. These clauses are so commonplace they are often considered boilerplate. See, e.g.,
Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1329 (4th Cir. 1987) (analyzing a
“boilerplate” force majeure clause).
12. See, e.g., id. at 1329 n.1 (referencing a force majeure clause that does not expressly require
unforeseeability).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 14–18.
14. See infra Section I.C.1.
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excuse noncompliance.15 Thus, the court’s presumption on the intended
meaning of force majeure may be outcome determinative.
COVID-19 has brought this inevitable clash to a head, with contracting
parties across the nation facing pandemic-related contractual interferences.16
While COVID-19 may intuitively seem like an unforeseeable event, this will
likely be far more difficult to prove than it first appears.17 An additional,
court-imposed unforeseeability requirement may prove fatal to prospective
force majeure defenses, when force majeure precedent already suggests very
few parties are likely to obtain relief.18 Disentangling force majeure’s
common-law understanding from its use as a contractual tool may avoid
increasing the burden on an invoking party who already has a steep hill to
climb.19 More importantly, disentangling these concepts is crucial to increase
certainty around force majeure clauses for future contracting parties and for
parties currently contemplating judicial relief, as these parties will be better
able to approximate the merits of their claim with clearer guidance on the
interpretation of force majeure in their jurisdiction.20
This Comment advocates for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt
an interpretive strategy that courts in Texas and Indiana have followed.21
This approach (“the Texas approach”) presumes that parties intend the term
“force majeure” to be defined exclusively within the contract, while
assigning common law the subordinate role of filling in the gaps.22 This
approach avoids illogical consequences, uncertainty, and the unnecessary
expenditure of judicial resources that arise under the presumption of common
law (“the common-law approach”).23
Part I describes the state of force majeure jurisprudence today.24 Section
I.A. provides an overview of the elements a party must satisfy to successfully
15. See infra Section I.C.2.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
17. See infra Section I.A, D.
18. See infra text accompanying note 151.
19. See infra Section II.C.2 (highlighting the risk of opening a rabbit-hole of litigation if courts
apply a common-law unforeseeability requirement to COVID-19 related disruptions).
20. See infra Section II.B–C.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Sections I.C.2. This approach is referred to as “the Texas approach” because it
emerged first in Texas and was later adopted in Indiana. See infra Section I.C.2.
23. See infra Section II.B–C.
24. This Comment will focus on force majeure and its common-law roots, as the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) does not expressly reference force majeure. See generally U.C.C.
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977). The closest reference in the U.C.C. to force majeure is
located within § 2-614, which outlines the doctrine of commercial impracticability. U.C.C. § 2614. Commercial impracticability closely mirrors the common-law doctrine of impossibility. E.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Though force majeure is
related to other common-law doctrines of excuse like the doctrine of impossibility, this Comment
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invoke a force majeure defense.25 Section I.B. highlights the limited
Maryland state precedent concerning force majeure.26 Next, Section I.C.
provides an explanation of the differences between the Texas approach and
the common-law approach.27 Finally, Section I.D. discusses recent cases
across the country in which courts have interpreted COVID-19 as a proposed
force majeure event.28
Part II compares these opposing presumptions and argues that Maryland
courts should adopt the Texas approach, which presumes parties intend the
term “force majeure” to be exclusively defined within a contract, while
permitting common-law to fill in the gaps. Section II.A. critiques the
common-law approach.29 Next, Section II.B. highlights the comparative
benefits of the Texas approach.30 Finally, Section II.C. argues that COVID19 provides the impetus for Maryland courts to definitively adopt the Texas
approach, in part to avoid tangential questions that may arise under the
common-law approach of whether the pandemic was a foreseeable event.31
I. BACKGROUND
Lawyers and courts often describe force majeure clauses as articulating
a “parade of horribles.”32 This is because force majeure clauses include a
laundry list of terrible and unlikely events that may excuse a party from
liability for nonperformance of their contractual obligations.33 Force majeure
will focus exclusively on force majeure. For a discussion of the differences between these doctrines,
see Kelley, infra note 166, at 93–97.
25. See infra Section I.A.
26. See infra Section I.B.
27. See infra Section I.C.
28. See infra Section I.D.
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. See infra Section II.B.
31. See infra Section II.C.
32. URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F. Supp. 1267,
1287 (D.R.I. 1996).
33. See, e.g., Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (referring to force majeure clauses as “a parade of horribles”). These terrible and
unlikely events run the gambit, as courts have analyzed large-scale events like the war with ISIS
and 9/11 under force majeure clauses, along with smaller-scale events like a power failure at a
wedding and a worker’s foot amputation. Middle E. Broad. Networks, Inc. v. MBI Glob., LLC, No.
1:14-cv-01207, 2015 WL 4571178, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2015) (holding the war with ISIS did
not excuse delays in delivery and construction of a broadcasting studio in Baghdad because the war
was not a force majeure event under the contract); OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc.,
266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221–24 (D. Haw. 2003) (rejecting 9/11 as a force majeure event that would
excuse a company’s failure to host a music event in Hawaii five months after the attack); Facto v.
Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding a power failure at a wedding
reception constituted a force majeure event under the contract); Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign
Contractors, Inc., 510 A.2d 319, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding the amputation
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clauses developed in modern contract law34 to ameliorate the harsh rules at
common-law, in which the promisor’s obligations were absolute.35 The force
majeure clause contracts around the common-law rule of absolute obligation
by providing parties with a mechanism to identify specific events that may
excuse nonperformance.36 Consistent with general principles of freedom of
contract, parties enjoy great leeway to allocate these improbable and
otherwise unpredictable risks.37 The court’s ultimate goal in interpreting a
force majeure clause, as in contract law generally, is to ascertain and
effectuate the parties’ intent.38
Section I.A. provides a brief overview of the elements a party must
satisfy to invoke their force majeure clauses and excuse contractual
nonperformance.39 Next, Section I.B. highlights the lack of Maryland
precedent concerning force majeure.40 Section I.C. describes the interjurisdictional divide between the Texas approach and the common-law
approach.41 Lastly, Section I.D. highlights recent cases concerning COVID19 as a force majeure event.42
A. Force Majeure Interpretation Generally
In a force majeure analysis the burden is on the invoking party43 to prove
that: (1) the event in question qualifies as a force majeure event under the
agreement; (2) the force majeure event caused the invoking party’s

of a contractor’s foot did not excuse the company’s failure to replace a sign as the amputation did
not constitute a force majeure event under the contract).
34. See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting the judicial
disposition before the nineteenth century of not permitting any excuses to nonperformance for a
promisor).
35. See Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235, 247, 63 A. 471, 473 (Md. 1906) (holding
that a windstorm did not excuse nonperformance of contractual obligations, as the promises were
unconditional).
36. Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
37. However, force majeure clauses may not be so broad that they make the contractual
promises illusory. See, e.g., Corestar Int’l PTE. Ltd. v. LPB Commc’ns, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107,
121 (D.N.J. 2007) (noting parties may not contract for a specific schedule for shipment and “at the
same time include a contract term that serves as an absolute defense to any delay”).
38. See Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 287 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting the force
majeure clause’s interpretation is “dependent upon the intent of the parties as garnered from the
wording of the instrument involved”).
39. See infra Section I.A.
40. See infra Section I.B.
41. See infra Section I.C.
42. See infra Section I.D.
43. Emerald Int’l Corp. v. WWMV, LLC, No. 15-cv-0179, 2016 WL 4433357, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 15, 2016).

804

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:799

noncompliance to the degree specified in the contract; and (3) any procedural
requirements set out in the force majeure clause have been satisfied.44
1. Does the Event Trigger the Force Majeure Clause?
A force majeure clause typically includes a list of specific, enumerated
events.45 Courts construe these enumerated events with their ordinary and
accepted meanings in such a way that aligns with the contract as a whole and
does not render another contractual provision meaningless.46 Additionally,
most force majeure clauses include a “catch-all” provision, which includes
general language that may encompass more types of events than those
specifically enumerated.47
In analyzing a catch-all provision, courts often employ the ejusdem
generis canon of construction.48 Ejusdem generis means “of the same kind
or class,” and is a canon of construction that interprets a general word
following a list of words to be similar in kind to the words in the preceding
list.49 For example, in Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign Contractors, Inc.,50 the
Superior Court of New Jersey relied on the ejusdem generis canon to hold
that a contractor’s foot amputation did not constitute a force majeure within
the contract’s catch-all provision, as an amputation was not similar in kind to
the enumerated events of “strikes . . . fires, floods, earthquakes, or acts of
God.”51

44. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, No. 15-025786-CK, 2015 Mich. Cir.
LEXIS 11, at *9–10 (Mich. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2015), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2015).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“A force
majeure clause must be construed, like any other contractual provision, in light of ‘the contractual
terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose of the contract.’”) (quoting Marchak v.
Claridge Commons, Inc., 633 A.2d 531, 535 (1993)). This requirement is particularly important in
considering the relationship between a force majeure clause and an assumption of risk provision.
See, e.g., Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1990) (“When a party
assumes the risk of certain contingencies . . . such contingencies cannot later constitute a ‘force
majeure.’”).
47. See, e.g., Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626, 636 (N.M. 2003) (analyzing a catchall provision).
48. See Seitz v. Mark-O-Lite Sign Contractors, Inc., 510 A.2d 319, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (declining to include a worker’s incapacitation in the force majeure’s catch-all
provision, as it was dissimilar from the enumerated events).
49. Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co. v. Rams Head Savage Mill, LLC, 237 Md. App. 705, 726,
187 A.3d 797, 809 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (quoting Ejursdem generis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
50. 510 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
51. Id. at 321–22.
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“Acts of God” are a unique enumerated term within a force majeure
clause, as some courts equate the term force majeure to the common-law
concept of an “act of God.”52 In modern jurisprudence, however, “acts of
God” have largely been incorporated as one kind of event that may be
included under the umbrella of a force majeure clause.53 An “act of God” is
traditionally understood as an “unpreventable event caused exclusively by
forces of nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado.” 54 By contrast,
force majeure clauses are generally drafted to include both “acts of God,” and
events which are within human control, such as strikes or government
interferences.55
The requirement that events fall within an enumerated force majeure
event or a catch-all provision is particularly important when parties invoke
financial difficulties or market fluctuations as an alleged force majeure
event.56 Generally, market fluctuations and increases in financial burdens are
insufficient to invoke force majeure.57 Courts will not presume that parties
intended market fluctuations or financial difficulties to be included within
either an enumerated event58 or a catch-all phrase.59 However, parties may
voluntarily bargain for and include market fluctuations or financial
difficulties within their agreement.60 This concept had historic application
during the 2008 financial crisis. Most courts rejected that the financial crisis
constituted a force majeure event, absent the express inclusion of economic

52. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1328 (4th Cir. 1987)
(referring to force majeure clauses and “[a]ct of God” clauses synonymously).
53. See, e.g., id. at 1329 n.1 (including “acts of God” within a list of force majeure events).
54. Gonzalez v. Tanimura & Antle, Inc., No. CV06-2485-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4446536, at
*9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (quoting Act of God, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
55. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc., 813 F.2d at 1329 n.1 (including both “acts of God”
and “strikes” and government interference within a force majeure clause).
56. See, e.g., Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (noting that “worsening economic conditions . . . do not qualify as a force majeure”).
57. See, e.g., id.; Hampton Island, LLC v. HAOP, LLC, 702 S.E.2d 770, 775 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010) (“[T]he fact that one is unable to perform a contract because of . . . his poverty . . . will not
ordinarily excuse nonperformance . . . .” (quoting Bright v. Stubbs Props., 210 S.E.2d 379, 380 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1974))); Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234, 1240 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (“[A]dverse economic conditions . . . do not constitute force majeure.”); see also infra notes
58, 60.
58. In re Millers Cove Energy Co., Inc. v. Moore, 62 F.3d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1995)
(“Courts . . . generally refuse to excuse lack of compliance with contractual provisions due to
economic hardship, unless such a ground is specifically outlined in the contract.”).
59. See, e.g., Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Co., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App.
1987) (declining to include economic changes within the catch-all provision).
60. See, e.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d
843, 851–55 (D. Minn. 2012) (comparing caselaw in which parties expressly included economic
downturns within a force majeure to caselaw in which parties failed to expressly provide for
economic downturns in the clause).
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hardships within the enumerated list of force majeure events.61 As a practical
result, the enumeration requirement limits the number of successful force
majeure claims because prospective parties must clear an initial hurdle by
proving that their alleged force majeure event is either specifically
enumerated or that it fits within the force majeure’s catch-all phrase.62
2. Did the Event Cause Noncompliance with Contractual
Obligations?
The second substantive hurdle to invoking a force majeure defense
requires the invoking party to demonstrate that the force majeure event
proximately caused its noncompliance63 to the degree outlined in the
contract.64 For example, in Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor,
LLC,65 the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether Chinese
government market manipulations that affected the price of solar panels
constituted a force majeure event within a contract.66 The court held that
because the acts of the Chinese government did not directly prevent the
invoking parties’ noncompliance, the Chinese government’s actions could
not excuse the invoking party’s noncompliance.67 Rather, the acts of the
Chinese government merely made compliance less profitable for the
invoking party.68
Furthermore, courts are unlikely to find an event was the cause of
noncompliance when the noncompliance resulted from the invoking party’s
61. See also supra note 60. Compare Elavon, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 841 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding the 2008 economic crisis was not a force majeure
event under a contract that did not contain a specific enumerated term for changes in economic
conditions), with In re Old Carco LLC, 452 B.R. 100, 120, 125–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding
the 2008 economic crisis constituted a force majeure event as it fell within the enumerated term
“change in economic conditions”).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 56–61.
63. Coker Int’l, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 747 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (D.S.C. 1990), aff’d, 935
F.2d 267, 1170 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that only force majeure events that directly cause
noncompliance may excuse nonperformance); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 461 N.E.2d
1049, 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (noting Illinois law requires force majeure events to proximately
cause the invoking party’s nonperformance).
64. See, e.g., OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (D.
Haw. 2003) (analyzing a force majeure clause that permitted cancellation of obligations when force
majeure made compliance “inadvisable”).
65. 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
66. Id. at 448–57.
67. Id. at 450. The Michigan Court of Appeals also noted that the lower court mistakenly
assumed the Chinese government’s actions fell within one of the enumerated events in the force
majeure clause as an “act[] of Government.” Id. at 447–48.
68. Id. The economic penalties for the invoking party were severe, as the invoking party was
liable for $1.74 billion and claimed the costs would force the company to leave the industry. Id. at
439.
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own negligent acts or omissions.69 If an invoking party voluntarily chooses
not to comply with its contractual obligations due to an increased financial
or logistical burden, courts generally find the invoking party’s own actions
were the proximate cause of noncompliance.70 Similarly, if the invoking
party was aware of a problem or danger and did not take actions to prevent
the event’s occurrence, the court may find the noncompliance was within the
control of the invoking party and that the noncompliance was a result of the
party’s own negligent acts or omissions.71
Courts also have articulated temporal limitations for the applicability of
a particular event to the force majeure provision in a contract. For instance,
in OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc.,72 a federal district
court considered whether 9/11 constituted a force majeure event in a contract
for a music and entertainment event.73 The court rejected the argument that
the 9/11 attack constituted a force majeure event because even if the
agreement included “terrorism” as an enumerated event, the connection was
too tenuous, as the entertainment event was scheduled five months after the
attack. 74 Thus, the directness requirement also limits the number of
successful force majeure claims, as the invoking party’s actions are closely
scrutinized and the temporal limitation has been narrowly interpreted.
3. Has the Invoking Party Satisfied All Procedural Requirements
Outlined in the Force Majeure Clause?
Finally, the invoking party must prove that any additional procedural
requirements expressed in the force majeure clause have been satisfied.75 In

69. White v. North, 121 Md. App. 196, 236, 708 A.2d 1093, 1113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998),
vacated on other grounds, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 (Md. 1999) (noting an “unwarranted
hardship” created by a party’s own negligent omission will not support a force majeure defense);
Middle E. Broad. Networks, Inc. v. MBI Glob., LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01207, 2015 WL 4571178, at *5
(E.D. Va. July 28, 2015) (rejecting argument that the war with ISIS caused noncompliance by
blocking delivery routes, because the proximate cause was the invoking party’s failure to pay a
subcontractor).
70. See Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App.
1987) (noting a contractual obligation cannot be excused merely because performance has become
more economically burdensome than anticipated).
71. Allegheny Energy Supply Co. v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 53 A.3d 53, 61–62 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2012) (holding that an abandoned gas well and a collapsed mine roof were inapplicable to the force
majeure clause, as the invoking party knew of the problem and failed to take substantial action to
prevent it).
72. 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Haw. 2003).
73. Id. at 1215–16.
74. Id. at 1224.
75. See Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, No. 15-025786-CK, 2015 Mich. Cir.
LEXIS 11, at *9–10 (Mich. 10th Jud. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2015), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2015) (noting procedural requirements may exist within a force majeure clause). This may
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some jurisdictions, the failure to comply with any affirmative obligation is
fatal to a force majeure defense.76 Relatedly, the remedy the invoking party
requests must be the remedy provided for in the contract. Force majeure
clauses may permit a variety of remedies, including suspension of obligations
and cancellation of the contract.77 But, only the remedy permitted in the
contract may be judicially enforced.78 This has become a common litigation
topic, with parties unsuccessfully seeking reimbursements of deposits, for
example, when their force majeure clause did not explicitly outline such a
remedy.79 Therefore, each of the requirements for a successful force majeure
claim narrows the number of litigants who will escape liability for contractual
nonperformance, and this thereby ensures that force majeure remains a
narrow exception to the general rule that contractual obligations are
absolute.80
B. Maryland and Force Majeure
States will likely face a surge of COVID-19-related contract litigation
in the coming months81 and there is already data suggesting federal district
courts have experienced an increase in COVID-19 related contract litigation
since the pandemic began.82 Those jurisdictions that have little-to-no force
majeure precedent will benefit from clearly articulating the relationship
between force majeure’s common-law and contractual significance.83
Notably, there is very little precedent in Maryland courts regarding force

include specific notice or mediation/arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Int’l Mins. & Chem. Corp. v.
Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding notice by the invoking party was inadequate
and therefore the force majeure defense failed).
76. Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (“The failure
to give proper notice is fatal to a defense based upon a force majeure clause requiring notice.”).
77. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1328 n.1 (4th Cir.
1987) (analyzing a force majeure clause that permitted suspension of obligations).
78. See, e.g., NetOne, Inc. v. Panache Destination Mgmt., Inc., No. 20-cv-00150-DKW-WRP,
2020 WL 3037072, at *5 (D. Haw. June 5, 2020) (rejecting force majeure claim seeking return of
deposits when the clause does not guarantee the return of deposits).
79. Id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 35.
81. See Jacob Gershman, Coronavirus Contract Disputes Start Hitting the Courts, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-contract-disputes-starthitting-the-courts-11587375001 (noting the expected “wave of [contract] litigation” amid the
COVID-19 pandemic).
82. See Rachel Bailey, Continuing to Track New Litigation Caused by COVID-19,
LEXMACHINA (July 16, 2020), https://lexmachina.com/blog/continuing-to-track-new-litigationcaused-by-covid-19/ (observing contract law as one of the top practice areas with the largest number
of cases, filed in federal district courts, that would not have been filed if not for the pandemic).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 2–7.
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majeure clauses.84 This Author could find no case in which Maryland courts
interpreted whether an event fell within an enumerated force majeure clause.
The first reference to a “force majeure” in the Maryland courts occurred in
1970, in which the Court of Appeals simply noted that voluntary actions
cannot constitute force majeure.85 Prior to that point, Maryland courts
referred only to “act[s] of God.” 86
Maryland follows principles of objective contract interpretation, which
bear on the interpretation of force majeure as a contractual clause.87
Maryland courts, like most jurisdictions, read the clear and unambiguous
language of the contract in order to determine what a reasonable person
would find the parties intended.88 In that vein, traditional principles of
contract interpretation support a narrow reading of a force majeure clause.
Additionally, Maryland courts, like many other jurisdictions, “do not
interpret contracts in a manner that would render provisions superfluous or
as having no effect.”89 Rather, these courts give effect to each clause in order
to avoid an interpretation that “casts out or disregards a meaningful part of
the language of the writing.”90 Maryland courts only stray from this
interpretive method as a matter of last resort.91
C. The Inter-Jurisdictional Divide Between the Texas Approach and
the Common-Law Approach.
As the court’s primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the parties, a court must determine what the parties intended the term
“force majeure” to mean within a particular contract.92 As force majeure is a
term of common-law significance, courts must determine whether the parties
intended the common-law definition to be imported into the contract, or
whether the parties intended to define force majeure exclusively within the
contract.93 To be clear, the outcome of a case may be identical regardless of

84. See infra text accompanying notes 85–86.
85. See Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 362, 265 A.2d 885, 891 (Md. 1970) (noting
action to remove buildings was voluntary and not due to a force majeure).
86. Tyler v. Capitol Indem. Ins. Co., 206 Md. 129, 138, 110 A.2d 528, 532 (Md. 1955) (noting
a contractual obligation may be discharged by an act of God).
87. Atl. Contracting & Material Co., Inc v. Ulico Cas. Co., 380 Md. 285, 300, 844 A.2d 460,
468 (Md. 2004).
88. Id. at 301.
89. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 81, 862 A.2d 941, 948 (Md. 2004).
90. Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., 234 Md. 156, 167, 198 A.2d 277, 283 (Md. 1964).
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying note 38.
93. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. App. 2018) (noting
sometimes “contracts include terms that have common law significance”).
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which strategy is employed.94 However, as the definition of force majeure at
common-law requires events to be unforeseeable, and a particular force
majeure clause in a contract may not expressly require unforeseeability, there
is a conceptual tension that may impact the outcome of a case.95
Thus far, courts that have addressed this question can be placed into two
categories.96 The first category includes courts that presume parties intend
force majeure’s common-law significance to be imported, and would require
a high bar to overcome that presumption.97 These courts tend to impose an
unforeseeability requirement upon the force majeure event.98 The second
category includes courts that regard the words of a self-defined force majeure
clause as controlling and permit common-law notions to fill in the gaps.99
These courts, more often than not, do not impose an unforeseeability
requirement on enumerated force majeure events.100 This Section discusses
the most prominent cases on both sides of this debate, beginning with the
common-law approach, and ending with the Texas approach.
1. The Common-Law Approach
Only federal courts have expressly advocated for an interpretive
presumption that parties intend common-law components of force majeure,
such as unforeseeability, to be read into a contract.101 This Author could find
no state court that has expressly adopted this view.102 Nevertheless, a string

94. See, e.g., id. at 185 (observing that even if the court did not apply an unforeseeability
requirement, the event would not constitute force majeure under the ejusdem generis doctrine).
95. See, e.g., Watson Lab’ys v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108–14
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing the parties’ dispute over whether unforeseeability ought to be imposed
on the force majeure event when the clause did not include an unforeseeability requirement).
96. Id. at 1111–12 (framing the two sides of this debate).
97. E.g., id. at 1109–14 (holding the parties intended the common-law definition, as they used
a boilerplate force majeure clause).
98. E.g., id. (imposing an unforeseeability requirement).
99. E.g., Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc. 861 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. App. 1993)
(“[L]ease terms are controlling regarding force majeure, and common law rules merely fill in gaps
left by the lease.”).
100. Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Tex.
App. 1987) (declining to impose an unforeseeability requirement).
101. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018)
(highlighting only the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits’ cases as
forming sides of this debate).
102. This is unsurprising, as many courts have not interpreted force majeure clauses at all. See
supra note 6.
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of federal district and circuit court cases, relying upon each other, shape the
doctrine.103
First, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,104 has
been cited as one of the earliest cases on this side of the debate.105 In Gulf
Oil Corp., the Third Circuit held that a gas supplier could not rely on force
majeure to excuse its failure to supply gas under a warranty contract because
the mechanical failures that caused noncompliance were ordinary and
foreseeable.106 Even though the clause did not expressly require force
majeure events to be unforeseeable, the court relied on the common-law
definition of force majeure, saying that it is “well settled” that force majeure
necessarily includes unforeseeable events.107 This case represents one of the
earliest attempts by a court to reconcile the common-law requirement of
unforeseeability with a force majeure clause that does not explicitly mention
unforeseeability.
Second, an alternative articulation of this rule emerged in a later case,
Watson Laboratories Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.108 This court
articulated a presumption that all force majeure events must be
unforeseeable, based upon its common-law definition.109 However, this court
would permit parties to supersede the common-law definition if a bargainedfor clause was sufficiently specific, such that it demonstrated an intent for the
words on the page to exclusively control.110 The court considered the
boilerplate force majeure clause at issue as fundamentally incapable of
demonstrating an intent to supersede common-law, as the parties did not
bargain for the terms.111
103. See TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 182 (“There has, indeed, been a debate regarding
whether common-law notions of foreseeability have any place in the interpretation of modern-day
force majeure clauses.”).
104. 706 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1983).
105. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 182 (referring to Gulf Oil Corp. as representative
of one side of this debate); see also Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship, 736 S.W.2d at 720 (rejecting Gulf
Oil Corp., as directly contrary to Texas and Fifth Circuit precedent).
106. Gulf Oil Corp., 706 F.2d at 454–55.
107. Id. at 452.
108. 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
109. Id. at 1113 (holding defendants failed to overcome the presumption that the invoking party
“agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an event which was foreseeable at the time of
contracting . . . .”).
110. Id. (contrasting the vague and boilerplate clause in Watson Laboratories with the “specific”
clause in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., which excused specific types of
government actions); see also E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988
(5th Cir. 1976) (noting the force majeure clause excused “any act of government . . . affecting
materials, equipment, facilities or completed aircraft”).
111. Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. AlliedGen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting a boilerplate force majeure
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In this case, the federal district court, applying California law, held that
the United States Food and Drug Administration’s shutdown of a medical
drug supply company’s manufacturer could not fall within the enumerated
event of a “regulatory . . . action.” 112 The court found that the term
“regulatory action” was too vague to demonstrate that the parties intended
the shutdown of a manufacturer, a non-party to the contract, to be included.
113
As the term was too vague and the clause was boilerplate, the court
imposed the common-law requirement of unforeseeability on the shutdown,
determined the shutdown was foreseeable, and, thus, that the force majeure
clause would not excuse contractual nonperformance.114
One stringent alternative is for courts to require parties to expressly
include “foreseeable events” within the clause if they intend foreseeable
events to be included.115 At least one bankruptcy court has embraced this
alternative.116 This court would only permit foreseeable force majeure events
to be included when parties specifically include language to that effect in the
contract.117
2. The Texas Approach
A few state courts, including those in Texas and Indiana, have expressly
adopted an interpretive stance regarding the relationship between commonlaw force majeure and its contractual equivalent.118 These courts allow the
terms of an enumerated force majeure clause to control the scope and

clause invokes a body of common-law analysis, while specific clauses are analyzed like any other
contractual provision).
112. Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1103–05, 1113.
113. Id. at 1109, 1113.
114. Id. at 1113.
115. In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, No. 18-12681-BKC-MAM, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 22, 2018) (requiring parties to expressly include “foreseeable events” to
overcome the presumption at common law that force majeure events are unforeseeable).
116. Id.
117. Id. (“[U]nder Florida law, force majeure clauses that include foreseeable events . . . are
permissible, [but] such events must be provided for in the language of the contract . . . .”).
118. See Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 716, 720–
21 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding there is no unforeseeability requirement for a specified force majeure
condition); Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (“[T]he scope and effect of a force majeure clause depends on the specific contract language,
and not on any traditional definition of the term.”).
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application of a force majeure analysis,119 and permit common-law to fill in
the gaps left by general exculpatory language, such as in a catch-all phrase.120
For example, in Kodiak 1981 Partnership v. Delhi Gas Pipeline
Corp.,121 the Texas Court of Appeals declined to apply an automatic
unforeseeability requirement when the proposed force majeure event fell
within an enumerated force majeure event in the contract.122 However, when
the proposed force majeure event instead falls within the general catch-all
phrase, the Texas Court of Appeals, in TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips
Co.,123 held that common law would fill in the gaps and the court would
impose an unforeseeability requirement.124
D. COVID-19 Disruptions as a Force Majeure
As of May, 2021 courts are still in the early stages of interpreting
whether COVID-19 and its related disruptions constitute force majeure
events, and few parties have been rewarded relief.125 This is primarily due to
the difficulty in isolating a particular COVID-19-related disruption that
directly caused noncompliance to the degree specified in the contract.126 In
one notable case, In re Republican Party of Texas,127 the Republican State
Convention of Texas was canceled due to COVID-19.128 While the majority
opinion did not rely on force majeure, the dissent reasoned that COVID-19
generally could not constitute a force majeure event, as its ongoing nature
was contrary to the clause which defined force majeure events as specific
“occurence[s].”129

119. Specialty Foods of Ind., Inc., 997 N.E.2d at 27 (“[W]hen the parties have defined the nature
of force majeure in their agreement, that nature dictates the application, effect, and scope of force
majeure . . . .” (citing Sun Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998))).
120. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App. 2018)
(holding the common-law unforeseeability requirement applies to general exculpatory language of
catch-all phrases).
121. 736 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App. 1987).
122. Id. at 716, 720–21.
123. 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App. 2018).
124. Id. at 182–83.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 126–147.
126. See, e.g., Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 20 C 2142, 2021 WL 534669,*7
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021) (noting even if COVID-19 fell within United Airline’s force majeure
clause, the airline must also prove COVID-19 directly caused the airline to cancel its flights); Future
St. Ltd. v. Big Belly Solar, LLC, No. 20-cv-11020-DJC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136999, at *20 (D.
Mass. July 31, 2020) (noting that, even if COVID-19 constituted force majeure, the invoking party
failed to prove how it caused noncompliance).
127. 605 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. 2020).
128. Id. at 49 (Devine, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 52.
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However, multiple courts have held COVID-19 fell within a force
majeure clause as a “natural disaster.”130 In JN Contemporary Art LLC v.
Phillips Auctioneers LLC,131 a federal district court in New York considered
whether the pandemic fell within a force majeure clause that would excuse
an art auction house’s failure to comply with an agreement to sell a
painting.132 The district court remarked that “[i]t cannot be seriously disputed
that the COVID-19 pandemic is a natural disaster.”133 Other courts have
reached similar conclusions.134 Therefore, recent precedent suggests parties
with the enumerated term “natural disaster” within their force majeure
clauses have a greater likelihood of COVID-19 successfully excusing
noncompliance.135
Parties have frequently invoked COVID-19-related government-issued
shutdown orders as a force majeure event.136 However, they have had limited
success arguing that these orders are force majeure events due to the
difficulty in demonstrating that the shutdown order itself caused
noncompliance.137 For instance, in Richards Clearview, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc.,138 a federal district court in Louisiana noted the difficulty of
determining whether a government-issued shutdown order affecting malls
caused the Bed, Bath & Beyond store to close.139 Although the store was
located in a mall which was forced to shut down due to the government’s
order, the Bed, Bath & Beyond store was excluded from the government’s
order and was not required to close.140
When the force majeure clause does not require strict impossibility, but
permits a more lenient standard, courts may have more flexibility in
130. See infra notes 131–134.
131. No. 20CV4370 (DLC), 2020 WL 7405262 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020).
132. Id. at *1–7.
133. Id. at *7.
134. AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, No. 20-CV-0310, 2020 WL
7024929, at *58–59 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020) (noting COVID-19 and its effects fits within the
enumerated term of “calamities” and arguably fits within the enumerated term of a “natural
disaster”); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 370 (Pa. 2020) (finding COVID-19
constituted a “natural disaster” under a Pennsylvania statute).
135. See also 1600 Walnut Corp. v. Cole Haan Co. Store, No. 20-4223, 2021 WL 1193100, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021) (finding the pandemic fell within a catch-all phrase as it was similar in
kind to “other life-altering national events [], such as war, riots, and insurrection”).
136. See e.g., In re Cinemex USA Real Est. Holdings, Inc., No. 20-14695-BKC-LMI, 2021 WL
564486, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021) (finding force majeure clause excused rental
payments for movie theatre forced to close by government order).
137. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 138–140; 143–146.
138. No. 20-1709, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160078, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2020), aff’d on other
grounds, No. 20-30614, 2021 WL 865310 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying Louisiana law).
139. Id.
140. Id. at *5 n.1, n.3.
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providing relief.141 In In re Hitz Restaurant Group,142 a bankruptcy court
examined whether the Governor of Illinois’s shutdown order of restaurants,
which permitted carry-out dining, caused the invoking party’s
noncompliance.143 The force majeure clause at issue did not require strict
impossibility.144 Rather, it permitted any force majeure event that “delayed,
retarded, or hindered” performance to excuse nonperformance.145 Because
the shutdown order “hindered” in-person dining, which constituted
approximately three fourths of the restaurant’s square footage, the invoking
party was excused from three-fourths of its rental obligations.146 In general,
these cases demonstrate that there are significant obstacles for parties
invoking COVID-19 as a force majeure event.147
II. ANALYSIS
COVID-19 exposes the inevitable clash between presuming the
common-law definition of force majeure as an unforeseeable event, and
presuming parties intend the contractual tool of force majeure to exclusively
control.148 For instance, under the common-law approach, COVID-19 is the
prototypical example of a force majeure event.149 Indeed, courts are already
referring to COVID-19 as a force majeure in dicta.150 However, force
majeure precedent suggests that few parties are likely to obtain relief from
their contractual obligations due to COVID-19.151 When a once-in-a-century
pandemic does not constitute a force majeure under most contracts, but
141. See infra text accompanying notes 142–146.
142. 616 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020).
143. Id. at 378–79.
144. Id. at 376–77.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 377, 379–80.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 127–140.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 149–154.
149. See, e.g., URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F.
Supp. 1267, 1287 (D.R.I. 1996) (providing cataclysmic examples of force majeure events, such as
“typhoons, citizens run amok, [and] Hannibal and his elephants at the gates”).
150. E.g., Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 977 F.3d 770, 779 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he force majeure
of the pandemic . . . .”); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 388 (Pa. 2020) (Wecht,
J., concurring) (calling the convergence of a “once-in-a-century pandemic” and postal delays a
“force majeure”); Westbury Flats LLC. v. Backer, No. LT-78308-12/KI, 2020 WL 5362063, at *5
n.2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 4, 2020) (noting legislation aimed to address the economic downturn caused
by the “force majeure of Coronavirus Pandemic of 2020”).
151. At the time of writing, only one court has permitted some form of relief due to COVID-19
disruptions. See In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) (permitting limited
relief for a restaurant closure due to a government-issued shutdown order). Precedent similarly
suggests that very few parties are likely to be excused for nonperformance. See supra Section I.A.
For an analysis of the applicability of COVID-19 as a force majeure event, see infra Section II.C.
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something as small as a power failure at a wedding does,152 this signals that
the role of force majeure in modern contract jurisprudence is deeply
confused. This Comment posits that this confusion is caused by the
indiscriminate comingling of the common-law conception of force majeure
with the contractual tool of the force majeure clause.153 It is, therefore,
crucial for courts to isolate an interpretative strategy that disentangles these
intertwined concepts.154
This Comment advocates for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt
the strategy employed in Texas and Indiana, which presumes the terms of a
self-defined force majeure clause are controlling, while relying on commonlaw merely to fill in the gaps.155 Under this approach, common law would
apply when the contract has general exculpatory language, such as within a
catch-all phrase, or when the contract merely invokes the word force majeure
and does not enumerate any specific events.156
First, Section II.A. discusses why the common-law approach is
flawed.157 Next, Section II.B. highlights the comparative benefits of the
Texas approach.158 Finally, Section II.C. argues that the Texas approach is
the ideal strategy to use in interpreting COVID-19 as a force majeure
event.159 This is due in part to the unique qualities of COVID-19, as a
widespread and temporally extended event.160 The Texas approach is
meritorious, as it provides certainty to parties while avoiding the unnecessary
expenditure of resources and time that would likely occur in disputing
whether COVID-19 constitutes a foreseeable event.161
A. The Common-Law Approach Results in Illogical Consequences,
Deviates from the Ordinary Meaning Canon of Construction, and
Relies Too Heavily on Legal Formalism.
This Section will argue that the common-law approach results in: (1) the
illogical consequence of requiring enumerated force majeure events to be
152. See Facto v. Pantagis, 915 A.2d 59, 60–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding a
power failure at a wedding constitutes force majeure under an agreement which explicitly lists
power failure as a type of force majeure).
153. See infra Sections II.A., II.B. (comparing whether common-law conceptions of force
majeure or the contractual force majeure clause should control).
154. See infra Sections II.B., II.C.
155. See infra Sections II.B., II.C.
156. See supra note 120.
157. See infra Section II.A.
158. See infra Section II.B.
159. See infra Section II.C.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 221–231.
161. See infra Section II.C.
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unforeseeable; (2) an unjustifiably high bar to overcome the common-law
presumption, which deviates from the ordinary meaning canon of
construction; and (3) a heavy reliance on legal formalism that may not align
with the parties’ ultimate intent.162
One of the principal cases on this side of the jurisdictional divide,163
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,164 articulated an
early reliance on the common-law definition of force majeure.165 However,
such reliance on the common-law definition to interpret an enumerated force
majeure event results in illogical consequences.166 The mere fact that parties
include a list of enumerated events in a force majeure clause demonstrates
that they foresaw the occurrence of the enumerated events at the creation of
the contract.167 To require enumerated events to also be unforeseeable is to
require a logical impossibility. 168 If this unforeseeability requirement is taken
seriously, it would effectively nullify enumerated events, which were all
technically foreseeable, as evidenced by their contemplation and inclusion in
the contract.169 To reconcile this, courts would need to draw a line between
foreseeable events that are so unlikely to occur that they are included as
enumerated events, and foreseeable events that are likely to occur and

162. See infra notes 164–189.
163. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. App. 2018)
(referring to Gulf Oil Corp. as representative of one side of this debate); see also Kodiak 1981
Drilling P’ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. App. 1987) (rejecting Gulf
Oil Corp., as directly contrary to Texas and Fifth Circuit precedent).
164. 706 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 452. To support this reasoning, the Third Circuit relied entirely on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Brooks-Calloway Co. Id. However, the Third
Circuit’s reliance on this Supreme Court precedent was in error because Brooks-Calloway Co.
involved a force majeure clause that specifically required all enumerated force majeure events be
“unforeseeable.” United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 121 n.1 (1943). Yet, the
clause in Gulf Oil Corp. did not include an explicit unforeseeability requirement. Gulf Oil Corp.,
706 F.2d at 456 n.8.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 167–171; see also Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your
Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91, 102 (2007)
(characterizing the Gulf Oil Corp. court’s interpretation as “unduly restrictive”).
167. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 288 n.4 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[I]n naming
specific force majeure events in the clause[,] the parties undoubtedly foresaw the possibility that
they could occur, and that is why they enumerated them to begin with.”).
168. Id. (“Indeed, to imply an unforeseeability requirement into a force majeure clause would be
unreasonable.”).
169. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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therefore, cannot constitute force majeure.170 This approach necessitates
contorting the concept of foreseeability just to remain logically cogent.171
An alternative articulation of the common-law approach, adopted in
Watson Laboratories Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc,172 must also be
rejected. This strategy presumes the common-law definition applies173 and
discounts boilerplate clauses as fundamentally incapable of demonstrating
that the parties intended their force majeure clause to overcome the commonlaw presumption.174
By rejecting boilerplate language as wholly
inapplicable, the court in Watson Laboratories set a high bar for the words
on the page to overcome the common-law presumption.175
For instance, if the disputed enumerated term is “government
interventions,” the Watson Laboratories court would assess whether the
clause appeared bargained-for by considering whether the clause appeared
specific or tailored to the parties.176 A sufficiently specific clause in the eyes
of the Watson Laboratories court, under this example, would likely require
precise reference to types of government interventions the parties anticipated,
such as denial of permits, delays in licensing, etcetera.177 However, this
specificity requirement is unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy, as it
creates perverse incentives for parties in these jurisdictions to simply modify
and lengthen their boilerplate language in order to demonstrate specificity.178
In that sense, this strategy simply kicks the can further down the road.

170. See Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113–14
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (distinguishing the “boilerplate” language of “regulatory,
governmental . . . action,” which bears a foreseeable possibility of occurring, from other
enumerated events that are “so unlikely to occur” as to make them “qualitatively different.”).
171. See supra text accompanying note 170.
172. 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
173. Id. at 1113 (holding defendants failed to overcome the presumption that the invoking party
“agreed to bear any loss occasioned by an event which was foreseeable at the time of
contracting . . . .”).
174. Id. at 1110; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp.
850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting boilerplate necessitates a common-law analysis, while specific
clauses are analyzed as any other contractual provision).
175. See Watson Lab’ys, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (holding a force majeure clause excusing
regulatory actions, among many other types of events, was too vague).
176. Id. (contrasting the vague and boilerplate clause in Watson Laboratories with the “specific”
clause in Eastern Airlines, which excused specific types of government actions); see also E. Air
Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976) (analyzing force majeure
clause excusing “any act of government . . . affecting materials, equipment, facilities or completed
aircraft”).
177. Id.
178. See id. (noting that the contrast between Eastern Airlines and Watson Laboratories instructs
contracting parties in California on precisely how to contract for more protective force majeure
clauses).
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There are also serious flaws in the most stringent articulation of the
common-law approach, adopted by a bankruptcy court in Florida.179 This
articulation requires that parties expressly include foreseeable events within
the force majeure clause if they intend foreseeable events to be included.180
Under such a stringent rule, the court does not give credence to evidence that
the parties intended their clause to exclusively control.181 Such a rule would
not consider the length, the specificity, or evidence that the parties had
bargained for the terms of their particular clause. Even a five-page,
bargained-for force majeure clause would not indicate the parties intended
the terms on the page to control under such a stringent rule.182 This
interpretation is contrary to the ordinary meaning canon of construction,
which calls for the interpretation of words in their ordinary meaning, unless
the context indicates they bear a technical sense.183 Force majeure’s
“ordinary . . . meaning” at common law undoubtedly requires
unforeseeability;184 however, a list of enumerated events may indicate a term
bears a technical sense within the agreement.185
One rejoinder to this is that when parties place so much emphasis on the
force majeure clause as to write a lengthy provision, they should have been
so thorough as to include “foreseeable” events within the clause, if that was
their ultimate intent.186 However, considering the lack of precedent
surrounding force majeure interpretation, and widespread confusion due to
the indiscriminate comingling of its common-law and the contractual
understandings, it is unclear that contracting parties reasonably would have
known to include these “magic words” within the clause.187 Similarly, it is
unclear whether parties reasonably would have intended the force majeure

179. In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, No. 18-12681-BKC-MAM, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 22, 2018).
180. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text.
181. See In re Flying Cow Ranch HC, LLC, 2018 WL 7500475, at *2 (requiring specific
language of “foreseeable events” if the parties intend foreseeable events to be included).
182. Id.
183. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 69 (2012).
184. See URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 915 F. Supp.
1267, 1281, 1287 (D.R.I. 1996) (“[F]orce majeure clauses have traditionally applied to unforeseen
circumstances . . . .”).
185. See, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. App. 2018)
(“A term’s common-law meaning will not override the definition given to a contractual term by the
contracting parties.”)
186. See supra note 173.
187. See supra note 6.
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provision to impose an unforeseeability requirement.188 Therefore, this
heavy reliance on legal formalism poses troubling consequences. While it
may have benefits of certainty and ease of administrability, it may prove illequipped to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is the ultimate goal of
contract interpretation.189
B. The Texas Approach Aligns with the Ordinary Meaning Canon of
Construction and Provides Certainty to Contracting Parties and
Courts.
The Texas approach aligns with the ordinary meaning canon of
construction, as it permits terms which bear a technical sense in the contract
to control.190 This approach is not burdened with the oxymoronic conundrum
of requiring foreseeable enumerated events to also be unforeseeable.191 Nor
does this approach create perverse incentives, as parties are not incentivized
to write extremely long and detailed clauses to satisfy some “specificity”
requirement under the Watson Laboratories approach.192
Additionally, the Texas approach best effectuates the parties’ intent.193
The mere fact that force majeure clauses have developed into such a
widespread contractual tool that they are now known as boilerplate194
supports the notion that common-law force majeure has, to some extent,
“fallen by the wayside.”195 It is reasonable to acknowledge that when parties
use a boilerplate contractual tool, their intention is to use a contractual tool.
Indeed, it is counterintuitive to presume that in using a boilerplate contractual
tool, the parties intended to invoke a body of common law, particularly when
such an interpretation may muddy their ability to rely on the contractual
provisions they specifically included.196

188. See E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir. 1976)
(noting that due to the uncertainty surrounding the force majeure clause, parties had “good reason”
to resort to general contractual language).
189. See supra text accompanying note 38.
190. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, supra note 183 (describing the “ordinary
meaning” canon of construction).
191. See supra text accompany notes 166–171.
192. See supra text accompanying note 178.
193. See supra note 38.
194. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (referring to a force majeure clause as “boilerplate”).
195. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998).
196. See id. (noting that imposing common law on a self-defined force majeure would “rewrite
the contract”).
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Courts that discount boilerplate language197 fail to recognize that
parties’ may intentionally choose to rely on boilerplate language.198 Parties
can, and do, intentionally choose to include boilerplate language, often due
to reasoned judgments regarding time and costs.199 A court should not
presume that language parties deemed sufficient to rely upon is not indicative
of the parties’ intent.200 To do so is tantamount to “rewrit[ing] the contract
or interpret[ing] it in a manner which the parties never intended.”201 Courts
that utilize principles of objective contract interpretation, such as those in
Maryland, should rely on the words of the contract as the closest
approximation of a parties’ intent when the term “force majeure” is selfdefined within the contract by the enumerated events.202
Finally, the Texas approach does not open a floodgate of force majeure
litigation; rather, it effectively maintains force majeure’s status as a narrow
exception to the general rule that parties are required to perform their
promises unconditionally.203 The Texas approach therefore aligns with the
underlying purpose of force majeure at common law, but it does so by relying
on objective principles of contract interpretation.
This approach is just as successful as alternative approaches in ensuring
force majeure remains a narrow exception, but it does so without creating the
illogical result of requiring foreseeable events to also be unforeseeable. 204
For instance, in the case of an enumerated force majeure clause, any “force
majeure” event must fit within an enumerated term or within the catch-all

197. See supra text accompanying note 174.
198. See supra text accompanying note 174.
199. See Jeremiah T. Reynolds, Defending Boilerplate in Contracts, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2008, at
10 (noting that although boilerplate contractual tools get a “bad rap,” they drastically reduce
transaction costs and permit parties to rely on standard language with reasonable assurances of how
the language will be interpreted).
200. See id. (noting significant reasons parties rely on boilerplate contractual tools, including the
fact that the lack of critical boilerplate provisions may mean the difference between winning and
losing a contractual dispute).
201. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998).
202. See Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 198, 892 A.2d 520, 526 (Md. 2006) (“We have long
adhered to the objective theory of contract interpretation, giving effect to the clear terms of
agreements, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of contract formation.”). This view is
most consistent with respecting the autonomy of contracting parties. See Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 567–68 (2003)
(describing contract interpretation’s goal as effectuating the parties’ intent, which follows from
respecting the autonomy of drafters).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 204–210; see also Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc.,
519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting force majeure under common law provides a narrow
defense).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 166–171.
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provision under the limiting ejusdem generis doctrine.205 Additionally, a
proposed force majeure event would be further limited by other contractual
clauses as the court would read the contract as a harmonious whole, 206
without casting out any meaningful provision of the contract.207 Furthermore,
even if a clause fits within the definition of a “force majeure” event as defined
in the contract, the invoking party still bears the burden of proving the event
caused noncompliance.208 The Court of Appeals can interpret this quite
strictly to only permit force majeure events that bear a direct relationship to
the noncompliance.209 Finally, the Court of Appeals may choose to consider
notice requirements strictly, such that failure to comply is fatal to the force
majeure defense.210
The Watson Laboratories case provides another example of why the
Texas approach is meritorious. This case would likely have resulted in the
same outcome under the Texas approach, but without injecting confusing
specificity requirements.211 For instance, a Texas court would likely have
considered a regulatory action against a non-party to the contract to “fit”
within the term regulatory event under the contract.212 However, it likely
would have found that the United States Food and Drug Administration’s
shutdown of a non-party was not the proximate cause of the invoking party’s
non-compliance.213 Rather, the proximate cause would likely have been the
invoking party’s failure to take steps to mitigate the occurrence, to find an

205. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 185–86 (Tex. App. 2018)
(applying ejusdem generis to a catch-all force majeure provision).
206. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petroleum (AEC), Inc., 157 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App. 2004)
(citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
207. Sun Operating P’ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 286–88 (Tex. App. 1998) (reading the force
majeure clause in light of the habendum clause).
208. Sherwin Alumina L.P. v AluChem, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding
mere increase in price to upgrade equipment did not prevent compliance).
209. See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2015) (holding Chinese market manipulations of solar panels did not constitute a force
majeure as the government’s actions did not directly cause the invoking party’s noncompliance).
210. See Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (“The
failure to give proper notice is fatal to a defense based upon a force majeure clause requiring
notice.”).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 212–214.
212. See TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 181, 193 (Tex. App. 2018)
(citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005)) (noting enumerated
events are analyzed under their ordinary meaning, unless the context indicates they bear a technical
sense).
213. See Sherwin Alumina L.P. v AluChem, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 957, 973 n.30 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (rejecting the argument that the burden of upgrading equipment prevented noncompliance);
see also Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex. App. 1987)
(“[A] contractual obligation cannot be avoided simply because performance has become more
economically burdensome than a party anticipated.”).
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alternative manufacturer, or to secure an adequate stockpile of the
pharmaceutical products their manufacturer could no longer produce due to
the shutdown.214
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should adopt the Texas approach,
which permits self-defined force majeure clauses to control the scope and
applicability of the analysis, while permitting common-law notions of force
majeure to fill in the gaps.215 This approach aligns with the ordinary meaning
canon of construction,216 it avoids illogical consequences of requiring
enumerated events to be unforeseeable,217 while respecting parties’ freedom
to contract,218 and it aligns with the underlying goal of force majeure to
remain a narrow exception to contractual obligations.219
C. COVID-19 Under the Two Approaches
This Section demonstrates that the Texas approach is the superior
interpretive strategy to employ in considering whether COVID-19 constitutes
a force majeure event within a contract, as it maintains force majeure’s status
as a narrow exception to the general rule that parties must perform their
promises absolutely, even during an ongoing and wide-spread event like the
COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the Texas approach is meritorious as it
avoids expending judicial time and resources on tangential questions of
whether the pandemic was a foreseeable occurrence.
1. The Texas Approach Maintains Force Majeure’s Status as a
Narrow Exception Even During the Widespread and Ongoing
COVID-19 Pandemic.
The Texas approach ensures force majeure remains a narrow exception,
even when COVID-19 is the invoked force majeure event.220 This is because
COVID-19 will be difficult to conceptualize and apply as a singular “event,”
and therefore it will be challenging for parties to demonstrate the pandemic
214. Valero Transmission Co., 743 S.W.2d at 663.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 190–196.
216. See supra text accompany notes 183–185.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 166–169.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 196–202.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 204–214.
220. A court will analyze whether COVID-19 fits within an enumerated event in the contract, or
the catch-all phrase. See supra text accompanying note 46. Some parties may have the term
“pandemic,” “epidemic,” or a catch-all phrase with similar enumerated events within their contracts.
Scott M. Kessler & Shane O’Connell, Mitigating the Effect of Event Cancellations During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, N.Y. ST. B.J., June/July 2020, at 31–32. Some parties may try to include
COVID-19 within other general categories like disaster, act of God, or causality. See Andrew A.
Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 57 (2020) (discussing COVID19 as an “Act of God”).
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was the cause of their noncompliance.221
First, the problem of
conceptualizing a temporally extended pandemic as a singular event is
particularly relevant when there are notice obligations that require, for
instance, notice of force majeure invocation within a certain number of days
after the event’s occurrence.222 Under a notice requirement, parties would
need to explain when precisely COVID-19 started preventing
noncompliance. This is so because the start and end dates are crucial for
determining the duration of the event, for which contractual duties may be
suspended.223
The Texas Supreme Court has already flagged this as an issue in In re
Republican Party of Texas,224 in which parties cited COVID-19 as a force
majeure to justify the closure of an arena that contracted to host the Texas
Republican Convention.225 While the state supreme court’s majority did not
address the contractual issue,226 the dissent engaged in a thorough force
majeure analysis that may signal how Texas courts may interpret COVID19.227 In that case, the force majeure clause required the invoking party to
notify the other party of the force majeure “occurrence” within seven days of
the “occurrence.”228 The dissent noted that the parties’ pleadings did not
identify any “occurrence,” other than the ongoing issue of COVID-19.229 The
dissent also noted that COVID-19 is a problematic “event” because it is
temporally extended.230 Because the parties could not point to a singular,
distinct “occurrence,” the dissent reasoned they could not comply with the
notice requirement.231 Second, the dissent signaled that COVID-19 as a force

221. See infra text accompanying notes 228–242.
222. See, e.g., In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex. 2020) (Devine, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing whether COVID-19 can be the triggering event when the contract required
notice within seven days).
223. Parties may argue the World Health Organization’s declaration of COVID-19 as a
pandemic on March 11, 2020, indicated the “start.” Transcript of Virtual Press Conference on
COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/
default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conferencefull-and-final-11mar2020.pdf?sfvrsn=cb432bb3_2.
224. In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d at 47.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 48.
227. Id. at 48, 49–54 (Devine, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 52.
229. Id.
230. Id. (“The coronavirus pandemic has been an ongoing public-health concern. . . . [I]t has not
been—and cannot be—boxed in as a single, distinct occurrence.”). Similarly, the court noted that
the parties could not identify when COVID-19 began as a pandemic under the contract. Id.
231. Id. (“A reasonable reader . . . would thus be puzzled on how to follow the seven-days’
notice requirement if one cannot pin down the occurrence to a specific calendar day.”).
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majeure event is problematic because of the causation analysis.232 The
dissent emphasized that compliance was possible because there were ways to
perform the contract, such as by catering to public safety measures.233
Additionally, there are serious directness concerns due to the nature of
a viral epidemic that gradually spreads, in conjunction with human and
governmental decisions about how to respond to the epidemic.234 In essence,
there are many events and actors between the inception of COVID-19 in
Wuhan, China to the virus somehow preventing compliance for one or both
parties to the contract.235 In Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor,
LLC,236 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that even one degree of
separation between the force majeure event and noncompliance was too
indirect.237 Here there are innumerous degrees of separation between the
event’s inception to the invoking party’s noncompliance.238 Additionally, as
economic downturns are insufficient bases for a force majeure claim,239 the
economic downturn due to COVID-19 is unlikely to be a sufficient nexus.240
Under the Texas approach, therefore, COVID-19 is unlikely to be successful
in most cases to excuse noncompliance under a force majeure clause.241
If parties can pinpoint particular events that prevent compliance,
however, it is more likely that the Texas approach will excuse the parties’
nonperformance.242 Although contracts that include government interference
as a force majeure event have the greatest likelihood for successful

232. Id. at 47, 53.
233. Id. at 52–53.
234. Paul K. Stafford, Coping with COVID-19: Business & Insurance Considerations for the
Virus that Made America Virtual, 18 J. TEX. INS. L. 3, 3–4 (2020). While there may be a temptation
to adopt a more lenient directness test out of concern for parties negatively affected by COVID-19,
courts should refrain from altering force majeure’s narrow directness test, and instead rely on
already existing doctrines in equity when appropriate and necessary. See infra text accompanying
note 256.
235. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AJMC (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020.
236. 86 N.W.2d 445 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68.
238. See supra text accompany note 235.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
240. Robert L. Gegios & Lance Duroni, The Legal Domino Effect: COVID-19 & Contracts, 93
WIS. LAW. 12, 13 (2020) (noting the difficulties of proving COVID-19 caused an economic
downturn due to human intervention). However, there may be openings for parties who suffered a
greatly depleted work force due to COVID-19 infections, or for parties who were directly
incapacitated due to COVID-19. See id. (observing that direct impact from COVID-19 supports
causation analysis).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 221–240.
242. See supra notes 230–231.
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invocation,243 the United States government’s response to the pandemic has
hindered contracting parties from claiming government intervention as the
cause of their noncompliance.244 For instance, proclamations of public health
emergencies are insufficient to cause noncompliance, as they do not prevent
a business from engaging in commercial activity to meet their contractual
obligations.245
Similarly, mere recommendations to institute social
distancing measures, to avoid nonessential travel, to wear a mask, etcetera
are also likely insufficient to cause noncompliance.246
The strongest case for a successful force majeure defense likely involves
a government-issued shutdown order.247 However, even those orders are
strictly construed, and many of the shutdown orders have carved out
exceptions limiting the number of parties that are actually compelled to shut
down.248 For instance, in Richards Clearview, LLC v. Bed, Bath & Beyond,
Inc.,249 a federal district court in Louisiana considered whether a government
shutdown order caused Bed, Bath & Beyond to shut down, or whether Bed,
Bath & Beyond fell into an exception to the order and closed down
voluntarily.250 The district court held the store’s closure was voluntary, as
the store was excluded from the closure mandate.251 Voluntary closures

243. See, e.g., Richard J. Nogal & Brian M. Dougherty, Illinois Contract Law on Force Majeure,
Impossibility, Impracticability and Commercial Frustration in the Age of Covid-19, 32 DCBA
BRIEF 10, 12 (2020) (noting government orders as a cogent argument for force majeure).
244. This leads to a somewhat ironic consequence, as states which wanted to encourage
economic growth by delaying government shutdown orders have made it more difficult for parties
within these jurisdictions to invoke force majeure. See supra text accompanying note 243.
245. See In re Republican Party of Tex., 605 S.W.3d 47, 53 (Tex. 2020) (Devine, J., dissenting)
(noting social distancing recommendations did not make compliance impossible).
246. There may be slight flexibility here if the contract requires less than impossibility and
permits inadvisability. But see OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d
1214, 1224 (D. Haw. 2003) (rejecting argument that the 9/11 terrorist attack and the resulting travel
disturbances made compliance inadvisable because the cancelled event occurred five months after
the attack).
247. Paul K. Stafford, Coping with COVID-19: Business and Insurance Considerations for the
Virus that Made America Virtual, 18 J. TEX. INS. L. 3, 4 (2020) (noting damages that result from
actions of civil authorities may trigger contractual or insurance protection as a force majeure).
248. See Brodie H. Smith, Beyond Force Majeure and Frustration of Purpose: How Else to
Defend a Contract Claim Based on the COVID-19 Pandemic, 62 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 32, 33 (June
2020), http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/publication/?i=661043&p=34 (noting the number of
exceptions to the California stay-at-home order “threaten[s] to swallow the [o]rder”).
249. No. CV 20-1709, 2020 WL 5229494 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2020), aff’d on other grounds, No.
20-30614, 2021 WL 865310 (5th Cir. 2021).
250. Id. at *1–6; see also In re Hitz Rest. Grp., 616 B.R. 374, 378–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020)
(holding a restaurant still had to pay partial rent because it was not forced to close entirely, as it was
able to continue carry-out dining).
251. Richards Clearview, LLC, 2020 WL 5229494, at *6.
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frustrate a force majeure defense because, generally, a party’s voluntary acts
and omissions may not constitute force majeure.252
The Texas approach provides certainty to parties, as they will be able to
assess whether force majeure defenses are prudent.253 As this analysis
indicates, the Texas approach does not open a floodgate of parties being
excused from their obligations.254 Instead, this approach provides clarity,
guidance, and reasonably narrow limits on when a party should be permitted
to avoid compliance with their obligations. 255 There are other common-law
defenses parties may rely on for leniency, which are conceptually preferable
as they do not result in contorting the interpretation of force majeure as a
contractual tool in the name of equity.256
2. Imposing the Common-Law Unforeseeability Requirement During
COVID-19 Goes Down the Rabbit Hole of Litigating Whether the
Pandemic was “Foreseeable.”
COVID-19 exposes why an interpretive strategy that presumptively
imposes an unforeseeability requirement on force majeure events is
undesirable.257 Under this interpretation, parties who are able to invoke
COVID-19 due to a “pandemic,” “quarantine,” “disaster,” or other similar
language may need to argue COVID-19 was an unforeseeable event.258 The
purpose of force majeure at common law was to create a narrow exception
for parties to escape contractual obligations.259 A court that classifies the
pandemic as unforeseeable, may inadvertently open the floodgates for large
hordes of parties to be excused for their nonperformance, as nearly every
contracting party in the United States faced the same global pandemic.260 The
same is true for government-issued shutdown orders, which have been

252. See supra text accompanying note 69.
253. See, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1331 (4th Cir. 1987)
(upholding a trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees to the opposing party, as the invoking
party brought a claim with no basis in caselaw).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 204–210.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 241–253.
256. See Gegios & Duroni, supra note 240, at 14 (noting force majeure litigation “will make for
difficult decisions, as courts grapple with key issues of respect for agreed contract language versus
recognition of the horrific and unforeseen effects of COVID-19 on blameless parties”).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 260.
258. See supra text accompany note 97.
259. See supra text accompanying note 38.
260. Gegios & Duroni, supra note 240 at 13 (noting “all businesses are facing a new reality of
supply disruptions, decreased demand for products and services, governmental prohibitions, and
strains on their ability to use or maintain workers”).
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instituted in almost every state.261 Courts will likely attempt to limit the
floodgate effect by honing-in on the causation analysis or focusing on
whether compliance was actually impossible.
In this case, the
unforeseeability analysis does not appear to be doing any of the work of
limiting an event’s applicability to the clause.262
There are additional administrability concerns that are likely to arise in
debating whether COVID-19 is a foreseeable occurrence, as there will likely
be extremely creative legal arguments that take up a court’s time.263 Will it
matter, for instance, if SARS, Swine Flu, and other similar epidemics have
affected the United States?264 Will it matter that government agencies exist
for the specific purpose of responding to pandemics?265 Will it matter that
scientists have been warning for years that a global pandemic was
imminent?266 Alternatively, will it be more persuasive that this is a once-ina-century pandemic and is the prototypical example of a force majeure?267
For contracts created during the COVID-19 crisis, would COVID-19 still be
unforeseeable for a contract made directly after the first case was publicized
in Wuhan, China?268 If so, at what point exactly would the virus cross over
from an unforeseeable event to a foreseeable event?269
The most important question is this: Are these abstract questions the
ideal way for courts to analyze which of the contracting parties should bear
the loss? These questions do none of the work in limiting the applicability
of COVID-19 to a clause, as courts would need to rely on proximate-cause
261. See Amanda Moreland, et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home
Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, 69
MORBIDITY
&
MORTALITY
W KLY.
REP.
1198,
1198
(Sept.
4,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm (noting from March to May alone,
forty-two U.S. states issued stay-at-home orders).
262. See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987) (noting
force majeure under common law provides a narrow defense).
263. See infra text accompanying notes 264–267.
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analyses or degree-of-interference analyses in order to avoid a floodgate
effect.270 These questions therefore operate as tempting rabbit holes, with
none of the net benefits of narrowing which parties may obtain relief, creating
clarity for parties, or alleviating the administrative load that is anticipated in
the wake of COVID-19.271
III. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the Texas approach in
construing force majeure clauses.272 This approach presumes parties intend
a force majeure clause with enumerated events to exclusively control, while
permitting common law to act as a gap filler for general exculpatory language
and catch-all phrases.273 The Texas approach is conceptually superior to the
common-law approach generally and for interpreting COVID-19-related
disruptions in contractual performance.
The Texas approach is preferable to the common-law approach, as it
avoids oxymoronic consequences of requiring foreseeable events to also be
unforeseeable274 by aligning with the ordinary meaning canon of
construction.275 It also avoids confusing specificity requirements,276 respects
boilerplate language out of a respect for freedom of contract,277 and avoids a
strict, formalist requirement that parties use “magic words” to overcome the
common-law presumption.278
Finally, the Texas approach is also is the best method for interpreting
COVID-19 and its related disruptions as force majeure events.279 This
approach avoids opening up the rabbit hole of whether the pandemic was
foreseeable, which is likely to take up valuable judicial resources with very
little net benefit.280 The Texas approach can most effectively respond to
widespread and ongoing events, such as COVID-19, while avoiding concerns
of a floodgate effect, present under the common-law approach.281 Finally this
approach provides much needed certainty to parties and courts, not only in
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274.
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See supra text accompanying note 258.
See supra text accompanying notes 263–270.
See supra text accompanying notes 155–156.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 166–171.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 177–179.
See supra note 203.
See supra text accompanying notes 187–190.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 264–270.
See supra Section II.C.1.
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interpreting COVID-19-related disruptions, but also in interpreting force
majeure clauses in a post COVID-19 world.282

282. See supra Section II.

